This study performs a panel analysis of banks' participation and bidding in the Eurosystem weekly repo auctions during July 2000-August 2001, employing a data set of individual bids that includes the bidder code, size, nationality and membership in a banking group. We adopt the econometric approach of Wooldridge (1995) to obtain consistent estimates in the presence of endogenous sample selection. We find that an increase in interest rate volatility lowers the probability of bidding, but induces bidders to shade bid rates less relative to the interbank market rate. We document several country effects, related to differences in the structure of the domestic money market and the opportunity cost of collateral. Large bidders participate more regularly and shade their bids less. Group bidders demand larger amounts in the auction, thus showing an attitude to act as liquidity brokers towards the rest of the banking system. Large bidders and group bidders manage their collateral more efficiently, as revealed by their superior ability to "ride the yield curve" and submit multiple bids. Our findings support the transnational bank hypothesis, according to which banks with a multinational profile use their informational advantage to arbitrage out the differences in interest rates across countries, thus fostering money market integration.
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Introduction 1
Every week several hundreds of banks in the euro area participate in the Eurosystem repo auction, the so-called main refinancing operation (MRO), which injects reserve money in the banking system. With average weekly allotments that currently exceed 200 billion euro and several hundreds of bidders, MROs are the largest auctions ever held in the world. They take place in a decentralised fashion, whereby the collection of bids and the provision of funds are carried out at local level by the National Central Banks (NCBs), whereas the ECB compiles the aggregate bid schedule and decides on the allotment. Through the interbank market the successful bidders channel the allotted funds to 7,000 credit institutions in the area, for their day-to-day li- with a new data set of individual bids that includes the bidder code, size, nationality and possible membership in a banking group.
Our motivation is twofold. Perhaps the most popular tenet of auction theory is the winner's curse hypothesis (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) , according to which auction participants bid a price below their valuation of the good when uncertainty is high. Previous research on the Eurosystem auctions, adopting mainly auction theoretical models, has shown an apparently puz-2 zling phenomenon. Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) measure the extent to which bid rates are below market rates in the MROs and find that this type of underpricing varies inversely with market rate volatility. This finding is at odds with the winner's curse hypothesis and most of the empirical evidence on treasury auctions 3 . On the other hand, examining the Eurosystem longer term refinancing operations, Linzert, Nautz and Bindseil (2004) show that banks behave accordingly to the winner's curse hypothesis 4 .
Our first motivation is to shed light on bidders' behaviour in the MROs by exploiting primarily the implications of the models of banks' optimum reserve management. The Eurosystem auctions are different from treasury auctions for several reasons; among other things, bidders in the former face a quantity risk related to the minimum reserve requirement, and to the caps on and costs of alternative sources of funds, namely the interbank market and the end-ofday marginal lending facility of the Eurosystem. Our analytical framework also draws from money market microstructure considerations. The ensuing hypotheses form the basis for the empirical analysis. Our data enables us to perform panel regressions of each of four variables which completely characterise bidders' behaviour in the MROs. Through the individual bidder code we can track the decision to participate or not in the auctions, the first variable of interest, modelled as the sample selection equation. The knowledge of the individual bid schedules further allows us to model the three regression equations, respectively for the bid amount, the average bid rate and the dispersion of bid rates.
A methodological novelty of this paper, compared to the empirical studies of bidding behaviour in financial auctions, is that we properly account for the presence of two sources of bias in the estimates of the regression equations for the bid amount, rate and dispersion. The first source is related to unobservable heterogeneity in individual characteristics and preferences, which are potentially correlated with the observable variables. To control for this type of bias we adopt a fixed effects panel regression framework. The second potential distortion derives from endogenous sample selection, which arises because the sample employed in the analysis is selected non-randomly. To correct for sample selection bias we follow the Wooldridge (1995) two-step estimation approach, which yields consistent results for the vector of coefficients and the associated standard errors. 4 tive segmentation, although cross-border repo turnover shows an increasing trend as traders make a growing use of links among Central Securities Depositories
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. Third, larger banks with a multinational dimension tend to centralise their liquidity management activities. What do we know about the "primary market" for liquidity, that is the Eurosystem repo auctions? Under the current auction format, the available evidence from analyses of aggregate data shows that bidding is competitive and most of the early problems encountered under the fixed-rate format have been overcome 11 .
In the second part of this paper we look at the extent of integration in the repo auctions.
These are by construction standardised and very open, yet participation may reflect peculiarities, related in particular to country effects, size effects and bank group effects. Each one of them in turn could tell us something on the issue of integration, which is essentially related to institutional factors and to market factors. The conjecture that country may matter is based on the available evidence, showing that the daily demand for reserves in member countries displays different degrees of interest-rate elasticity and that some regional effects are present in the interbank market's functioning (Angelini, 2002) . The finding that country matters would thus suggest that, from the perspective of bidding behaviour, integration is not complete. One could then hypothesise that higher stages of integration might be achieved in the future, also in view of planned institutional innovations. We refer in particular to the enlargement of the pool of eligible collateral to include bank loans throughout the area, according to the ECB's Governing Council decision on the "single list" of 2004 12 . On the other hand, the finding that size and participation in a group systematically affect bidding behaviour across the geographical borders might have implications for the hypothesis that larger and/or multinational banks act as promoters of integration, which is typically a market factor. Therefore, using the information on the bidders' nationality, size and possible membership in a multi-country banking group, we specialise the panel analysis and test whether and how the behaviour of bidders is affected by each of these three variables in turn.
To put our effort in the right perspective, two remarks are in order. First, our investigation is largely exploratory. Unlike the studies on world market integration 13 , we do not perform a test nor derive an index on the scale of integration in the repo auctions. This choice is related to the fact that our data sample spans a relatively short interval of time. Second, the notion of market integration is usually associated to the law of one price, and hence it might be viewed as an allor-nothing issue. We believe that our empirical results for the price equation, i.e. the bid rate, although revealing significant regularities, have an order of magnitude that does not seriously challenge the broad validity of the law of one price in the euro money market. Bearing in mind the above considerations, we see our contribution on the issue of market integration as an attempt to exploit the microeconomic evidence of bidding and pin down the factors, both institutional and market-driven, that are likely to hold back or foster integration in the euro money market in the future.
In Section 2 we describe the analytical framework and derive testable predictions for bidders' behaviour in the MROs. Section 3 presents the auction environment and gives summary statistics on the data sample. Section 4 describes our econometric approach. Section 5 shows the empirical results from the general model of participation and bidding. Section 6 presents the estimates on country effects. The evidence on size effects is given in Section 7. Section 8 contains the estimates on the effect of participation in a banking group. Section 9 summarises our findings and concludes. The Appendix provides details of the ARCH model for interest rate volatility.
Theoretical predictions
Banks' behaviour in the Eurosystem auctions should be viewed within the broader context of optimum reserve management models (see in particular Campbell, 1987; Hamilton, 1996; Furfine, 2000; Bartolini, Bertola and Prati, 2001; Taylor, 2001; Angelini, 2002) . In a simple two-period setting characterised by a minimum reserve requirement with averaging, exogenous liquidity shocks and stochastic interbank interest rates, the bank's optimum demand for reserves in the first period is directly related to the forecast liquidity need and to the difference between the expected interest rate in the next period and the current interest rate (Taylor, 2001), i.e. to the forward rate spread. Under the hypothesis that banks are risk averse, it may further be shown (Angelini, 2002) that an increase in short term rate volatility will induce the representative bank to demand a larger amount of reserves in the first period. We note that bidding in the 6 Eurosystem auctions is a key part of the bank's overall demand for reserves, the remainder being reflected in interbank market transactions, and we expect the former to be driven in the first place by the economic forces described by the theory. When we translate the theoretical hypotheses into our bidding environment, we note that each bank is no longer a rate-taker as in the stylised models, because it may bid a rate as well as a quantity of reserves. This implies that the three explanatory variables, namely liquidity need, forward rate spread and interest rate volatility, should all have a positive effect on the decision to participate in the auction, the total bid amount and the average bid rate of each bank.
We list these qualitative hypotheses in Table 1 , where the first column gives the candidate explanatory variables for each of the dependent variables, namely participation (column P), bid amount (column B), average interest rate (column R) and bid rate dispersion (column D). Each cell reports a +/-sign showing the effect of the explanatory variables onto each dependent variable and a symbol indicating the relevant theory.
When we move to a multi-period world with reserve averaging, it can be argued (Furfine, 2000) that the endowment of reserves inherited from the past enters into play, affecting inversely today's demand for balances. In our framework, the reserve endowment can be captured by the reserve fulfilment ratio of a bank, given by the average reserve holdings (until the day before the auction) divided by the bank's reserve requirement. The reserve fulfilment should thus have the opposite effect of liquidity need on the dependent variables P, B and R.
An additional feature of the reserve management model as it becomes increasingly realistic is that banks may have a target level of end-of-day reserves, related to the need for working balances and the desire to fulfil the requirement smoothly (Campbell, 1987; Hamilton, 1996; Bartolini. Bertola and Prati, 2001) . We cast this hypothesis into our setting by postulating that the bidder seeks to some extent to roll over the amount of the MRO that expires on the auction's settlement day. Hence his decision to participate in the auction, bid amount and average bid rate should be positively affected by the explanatory variable Maturing MRO amount. Accordingly, these hypotheses are included in Table 1 .
Participation and bidding in the MROs can also be viewed from the perspective of auction theory. A classical argument is that in a discriminatory auction with private information on the resale value of the good, bidders adjust their bids for the winner's curse. In our setting this would imply that bidders respond to an increase in interest rate volatility by reducing quantity demanded, reducing the average bid rate and increasing rate dispersion. It may also be argued that small, marginal bidders facing increased volatility could even decide to stay away from the auction, and make recourse instead to the interbank market. We note however that the "loser's 7 nightmare" argument may be invoked against the prediction of the winner's curse on bid amount and rate. Namely, if the risk of losing, not winning, the auction is a concern for the participants, then it is possible that interest rate volatility may induce them to submit larger bids at higher rates (Simon, 1994) . That the loser's nightmare may prevail over the winner's curse is suggested by the existence of caps on credit lines among banks, which constrain the recourse to the interbank market, and to the peculiar setting of the MRO auction, where the auctioneer is in a special position, whereby he imposes an intertemporal constraint on the minimum amount of the good, i.e. reserves, that bidders have to hold. We note that the predictions of the loser's nightmare would be consistent with those of the reserve management model under risk aversion.
An important feature of our bidding environment is the possibility that some bidders are "squeezed" after the auction, thus being forced to borrow in the interbank market at very high interest rates in order to fulfil the reserve requirement. The squeeze may result from lower than expected supply in the auction, such as to make liquidity tight at the aggregate level. A model in which bidders face the risk of a squeeze subsequent to the auction is developed by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) , who formulate in particular the hypothesis that a bidder entering the auction with a short liquidity position will increase the variance of bids. In the absence of data on the individual liquidity positions of bidders in our sample (see the next section), there is no direct translation of the above proposition in our setting on a cross-section basis. However, if we adopt extensively the above hypothesis over different auctions in time, it might be argued that an increase in the probability of a short squeeze is likely to make the short positions of bidders even worse. Thus we hypothesise that the likelihood of a short squeeze would increase the variance of bid rates, together with participation and bid amount.
Other strands of research and empirical considerations can be brought to bear on our empirical model. In particular, we believe that the Freixas-Holthausen hypothesis, that larger banks with a multinational role will arbitrage out the differences in interest rates across countries, has an important implication for bidding in the Eurosystem auctions. Ceteris paribus, we would expect larger banks to participate more actively in the auctions and submit larger bids compared to smaller banks with a local profile and limited information. This suggests that the bidder's size and participation in a multi-country banking group may be included among the set of explanatory variables.
The use of collateral to be pledged against the Eurosystem refinancing involves an opportunity cost for banks, related to the liquidity of the assets. As we have noted, there is a great variety in the list of eligible collateral. It may be argued that, as the auction size increases, corresponding to an increase in the aggregate liquidity need, the use of "dear" collateral is likely to 8 increase as well. Other things being equal, the increase in the marginal cost of collateral would cause a downward pressure on the individual bid amount and rates, along with a tendency to disperse more. Furthermore, using a standard cost-of-carry argument, it may be argued that the cost of marketable collateral is inversely related to the spread between long term yields and the minimum rate set by the Eurosystem. An increase in the long term spread would indeed make it more profitable for banks to buy or repo-in collateral and fund it with short term money from the Eurosystem or, in the traders' parlance, "ride the curve". This is particularly true of assets with an active interbank repo market, like treasury securities and asset-backed securities, which represent the bulk of eligible collateral in the euro area. Hence, we would expect the long term spread to have a positive impact on banks' participation and bid amount.
Lastly, we note that participation and bidding is also affected by the spread between the short term money market rate, represented by the 2-week EONIA swap rate
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, and the Eurosystem minimum bid rate, which incorporates the expectations on the stance of monetary policy.
For instance, the expectation of an imminent rate cut by the ECB, pulling the value of the short term spread close to or even below zero, would involve a reduction in the number of bidders, bid amount, rates and dispersion. The opposite would hold under expectations of monetary policy tightening and a large value of the short rate spread. It might be argued that the short rate spread is correlated to some extent with another explanatory variable, namely the forward rate spread discussed earlier on. In practice, however, the two display a modest correlation 15 .
We are aware that the analytical background presented in this section is eclectic in nature.
Like all empirical studies of auctions, we cannot go beyond a list of qualitative hypotheses, and we clearly resolve the trade-off between theoretical elegance and heuristic power in favour of the latter. Nonetheless, we note that the ensuing predictions, with the significant exception of the effects of volatility, are unambiguous and coherent among themselves.
Market and data
The auction
14 Although general collateral repos on the interbank market are the closest financial substitute for the ECB repo, we take the 2-week overnight index swap rate as the key money market rate, like in other empirical studies, because the latter contract is by far the most liquid in the euro area. 15 See footnote 22 for details.
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The MROs are liquidity-providing operations with a maturity of two weeks 16 that enable the Eurosystem to resettle the desired amount of bank reserves once a week
17
. The minimum bid rate is established by the ECB's Governing Council in its monetary policy meetings. Each bidder can submit up to ten bids. The Council also sets the rates on the two end-of-day standing facilities, marginal lending and deposit, which delimit the "corridor" of short term interbank rates.
In the sample period the minimum MRO rate was raised from 4. Bids may be submitted until 9:30 on Tuesday by any euro area bank presenting adequate operational and financial standards. Out of the 7,000 credit institutions operating in the area during our sample period, around 2,400 were eligible counterparties. In practice, in the 61 auctions covered by our data set the actual number of bidders was way below the potential and showed a diminishing trend, ranging between 798 and 240, as shown in Figure 2 . In the sample period the total bid amount ranged between 25 and 258 billion euro, with an average of 145 bil- 16 Since March 2004 the maturity of MROs has been shortened to 1 week. As a consequence, the average allotment amount has doubled compared to our sample period. 17 The low frequency of central bank interventions compared to other countries is made possible by the large amount of the reserve requirement compared to the demand for settlement balances. The averaging provision on the former creates a liquidity buffer for banks' daily liquidity management.
lion euro (Figure 3 ). The allotment varied between 5 and 172 billion euro, with an average of 88 billion euro. The average bid-to-cover ratio is equal to 1.65.
After the collection of bids by the NCBs, the ECB ranks all bids in descending rate order and decides on the allotment. Bids below the marginal, or stop-out, rate are dropped; bids above the marginal rate win the auction, and bids at the stop-out rate are allotted pro-rata. The result of the auction is published by the ECB on wire services at 11:20 on the auction day. The announcement gives the total allotment, total bid amount, number of bidders, minimum and maximum bid rates, weighted average allotment rate, marginal rate and percentage of allotment at the margin. Settlement of the auction is on the day following the auction, i.e. normally on Wednesday.
The actual allotment tends to lie close to the neutral amount (ECB, 2002) . The spread between the marginal rate and the minimum rate was between 0 and 43 basis points, the difference between the average allotment rate and the marginal rate was between 0 and 6 basis points ( Figure 4 ). The standard deviation ranged between 4 and 19 basis points for the bid rates, and between 4 and 18 basis points for the allotment rates ( Figure 5 ).
Data
In the empirical analysis we will consider the bidding behaviour of each bank, ignoring the amounts allotted ex post by the ECB and the resulting rates. We do that because, as we pointed out earlier, we are interested in the determinants of the demand for liquidity in the auctions, whereas the allotments would reflect the preferences of the Eurosystem as well as those of bidders. rays of a small number of bidders which merged at some stage in the sample period, thus treating them as if they had been a single bidder from the start of the period. We thus ended up with 1032 bidders which took part in at least one auction in the period between the switch to the variable rate tender and the end of our sample. We note that in the following analysis we are forced to "sacrifice" the first two auctions of that period. In fact, we need to retrieve one important explanatory variable, namely the maturing amount for each bidder, which corresponds to the individual allotment amount of the MRO with two lags. We do not know this variable for the first two auctions under the new format. However, from the third auction onwards we are able to compute the maturing amount from the individual bidding schedules and the information on the auction results. Hence the data set that will be used in the empirical analysis is made of 59 auctions.
The frequency of bidding is given in Table 2 , which shows that 30 bidders, who bid at least once in the first two auctions under the new format, dropped out of the group of bidders in the following 59 auctions. 199 bidders placed bids between 1 and 10 times, 169 placed bids between 11 and 20 times, and so forth. The number of bidders which were present throughout the 59 auctions in the sample is 25. Table 3 After auction participation (see Table 2 ), the second dependent variable is the individual bid amount, as a percentage of the area requirement, with an overall mean value of 0.2249. The third dependent variable is the weighted average bid rate, taken as a spread over the minimum bid rate set by the ECB. Its overall mean value is 0.0547, i.e. over 5 basis points above the floor rate. The last dependent variable is the weighted dispersion of bid rates, given by their standard 12 deviation. Its overall average is 0.0063, i.e. below 1 basis point, reflecting the fact that the majority of bidders does not avail itself of the possibility to submit multiple bids in the auction, and uses just one or very few bids. Indeed, we had a look at the overall frequency distribution of bid dispersion, and found that 35 percent of the bids are single bids (with a nil dispersion), and an additional 45 percent show a dispersion below 1 basis point.
Next we turn to the candidate explanatory variables. We do not have data on the individual reserve fulfilment of each bidder at the time of the auction, and our best proxy is the reserve fulfilment ratio of the bidder's country as of the day before the auction. The overall minimum and maximum are 59.22 and, respectively, 145.57.
The maturing amount of a bidder is equal on average to 0.0671 of the area requirement.
As concerns the bidder's size, we have accurate data on each bidder's reserve requirement during the thirteen monthly maintenance periods, which we use as the measure of bidder size. Again, we express this variable as a percentage of the area reserve requirement. The variable's overall mean is equal to 0.0623 percent of the aggregate requirement. The individual bidder's size varies moderately over time, as shown by the low value of the within standard deviation, equal to 0.0174, as opposed to a between standard deviation of 0.2197.
The remaining explanatory variables are all bidder invariant, and their summary statistics are given in the bottom part of Table 4 . The expected amount of the MRO has a mean value of 76.04 percent of the area reserve requirement.
The forward rate spread is given by the difference between the 2-week forward swap rate one week ahead and the current 2-week rate. This spread captures the difference between the expectation of the interest rate of the next MRO and that on the current MRO, and it measures the intertemporal trade-off between consecutive auctions. Its mean value is -2.36 basis points, with a range between -30 and +9 basis points.
The average short rate spread is defined as the difference between the 2-week EONIA swap rate on the day before the auction and the minimum auction rate. Its mean value is equal to 7.17 basis points, and it ranges between -6 and +45 basis points. The mean of the long rate spread, defined as the difference between the 10-year Bund yield on the day before the auction and the minimum bid rate, is equal to 41.07 basis points, and it ranges between -10 and +107 basis points
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. 22 The three interest rate explanatory variables could show some degree of correlation, with adverse consequences for the precision of the regression estimates. It turns out that the correlation between the short spread and the forward spread is equal to 0.13; the correlation between the short spread and the long 13
We estimate short rate volatility using an ARCH(1) model on the daily series of the 2-week swap rate, where the short rate is a function of its own lag and the conditional variance is a function of the short rate spread plus dummy variables that capture calendar regularities and institutional features of the euro area money market (see the Appendix for details). The resulting conditional variance on the auction day is equal on average to 0.0014.
We construct an explanatory variable taking the value 1 if the bank belongs to a bank group. Among our bidders, we record 31 multinational banking groups with a minimum of 2 bidders and a maximum of 6 bidders each. The bidders belonging to a group are 79 in total. Finally, in the list of explanatory variables we include two other dummies. Both capture the increased likelihood that some bidders may end up squeezed after the auction. The first one, called "Post underbidding", is equal to 1 in the MRO that followed the underbidding episodes of 13 February and, respectively, 10 April 2001 (see ECB, 2001b . This dummy reflects the fact that, after those underbid auctions, bidders feared that the ECB might have squeezed liquidity
by providing an amount of refinancing below the neutral value, as it indeed happened. The second dummy is a period-end dummy variable taking the value 1 if the MRO is the last-to-besettled in the maintenance period.
estimating the regression equations via standard fixed effects panel techniques would yield biased and inconsistent results (see Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 17) . We note that in a cross-section framework, estimation in the presence of endogenous sample selection can be performed relatively easily using the Heckman (1979) two-step approach. On the other hand, in a panel framework the problem is complicated by the time dimension. Wooldridge (1995) provides a two-step parametric approach for testing and correcting for selection bias in linear panel data models. The method requires a standard probit regression for each time period followed by a fixed effects linear regression. The errors in the selection equation are assumed to be normally distributed, but they are allowed to display arbitrary serial correlation and unconditional hetero- The model for each of the three regression equations is as follows:
In equation (1) 
23 Other approaches have also been proposed in the literature. In particular, Kyriazidou (1997) develops a semiparametric method based on "differencing out" over time both the unobserved components and the sample selection effect. Under alternative distributional assumptions, Rochina-Barrachina (1999) also develops a method that exploits estimation in differences. The latter two methods are devised essentially for panel data sets with a large number of individuals and a small number of observations. In our case, characterised by up to 59 observations for each individual, any estimation in differences would be extremely cumbersome, because it would involve a large number of pairwise combinations.
For the variable describing the participation choice we have fitted a fixed effects panel probit model by "brute force" using Newton's method 24 . The program is able to estimate the vector of the structural parameters plus the N fixed effects because it takes advantage of the sparse structure with a large diagonal sub-matrix of the Hessian matrix (we refer the interested reader to Greene, 2003) . In the regression equations for each of the three endogenous variables we have implemented the Woooldridge's two-step procedure as follows 25 . Starting from the assumption of a linear correlation between the errors of the selection equation and the errors of the regression equations, in the first step the inverse Mills ratios (henceforth IMRs) for the selection equation are estimated. The IMRs are achieved, for each time period
, by running a standard cross-section probit regression on the following model:
where the IMR is defined as: . The final step is a standard fixed effects regression on the set of all the variables λ , x , to obtain a consistent estimator of the vector of interest β . The model for this final step is as follows:
where
λ is built by stacking the IMRs estimated for each cross-section. 24 We employed the algorithm available in LIMDEP, Version 8. 25 We have not found any off-the-shelf implementation of the Wooldridge method in any of the econometric packages available to us. We have considered the following: LIMDEP, RATS, STATA, EViews, Pc-GIVE, and SAS. Professor Rochina-Barrachina kindly provided to us the GAUSS program that she had developed for her joint paper with C. Dustmann λ . As we will see later on, for all three behavioural variables the coefficient of λ displays a highly significant value.
A final issue is the computation of asymptotically consistent ( )
for the coefficients. When a fixed effects regression equation includes predictor-generated regressors, such as our array of IMRs, the standard errors are generally inconsistent (see Pagan, 1984) , because they do not take into account the sampling variability of the predictor generated regressor. In order to compute a consistent variance-covariance matrix we have implemented the sandwich estimator proposed by Wooldridge (1995) . Considering the vector ( ) ρ β θ, = of the structural parameters in the main equation (4), we have
where the matrix X collects all the data columns of the variables λ , x in the final fixed effects regression. Huber (1967) and White (1980) have originally proposed this approach to obtain a robust estimator in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In our case the outer matrix is simply the variance-covariance matrix provided by the fixed effects regression, while the inner matrix B accounts for the presence of errors in the series of the IMR variable estimated in the probit step.
The matrix B is computed as the variance-covariance matrix of the vector measuring the correlation with the residuals induced by the estimation of the IMRs (see the Appendix of Wooldridge, 1995 for further details).
Results of the general model
Participation
We estimate the probability of bidding with a panel probit regression of the type:
where * ,t i h is the latent variable which underlies the decision to participate in the auction. We recall that we have 1,032 bidders in the data set and 59 auctions.
x denotes the vector of explanatory variables for bidder i at time t, including for notational simplicity the time series variables that do not change across bidders and the dummy variables, and δ is the coefficients vector. Equation (5) says that the probability that a bidder participates in the auction is distributed as a standard normal and its argument is a linear function of our explanatory variables plus the individual specific fixed effect.
The regression results are given in Table 5 , column P. All the explanatory variables are highly statistically significant. The country fulfilment ratio has a negative effect (-0.0077) on the probability of entering the auction, as predicted by reserve management theory. In words, the larger is the cumulative reserve position of banks in the bidder's country on auction day, the lower is the probability that each bidder will participate in the auction.
The forward rate spread has a positive effect on the likelihood of bidding, with a coefficient of 1.6285. This is again in line with the notion that bidders manage their reserves in an efficient manner. When the forward rate is larger than its spot value, reflecting for instance the expectation of a monetary policy hike in the following weeks, then more bidders enter the auction, and vice versa.
Short rate volatility has a negative and significant effect (-20.3052 ) on the probability of bidding. This finding goes against the hypothesis that banks are risk averse and, facing an intertemporal constraint on the minimum amount of reserves, they react to increased volatility on the cost of their funding by bidding more actively. On the other hand, the negative coefficient would seem consistent with the winner's curse hypothesis.
The coefficient estimate for the maturing MRO amount (1.1608) shows a direct effect on participation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that bidders have a target for the level of end-of-day reserves, related to the demand for settlement balances and the pursuit of a smooth fulfilment pattern.
The coefficients for the post underbidding dummy and the period end dummy are both positive (0.2597 and, respectively, 0.0981). The sign of the coefficients is as expected, based on the hypothesis that an increase in the likelihood of a short squeeze causes more bidders with a short position to bid in the auction.
The bidder size has a positive effect on the likelihood of bidding (1.0059). This seems consistent with the two-tier or transnational market hypothesis: other things equal, larger banks are more likely to participate in the auction owing to their role as liquidity dealers in the domestic and cross-border market.
The expected auction amount has a positive effect (0.0041) on the probability of bidding.
We had no clear a priori. This result may perhaps be interpreted in light of optimum reserve management. The expected MRO amount is directly related to the perspective liquidity need of the banking system. We have already included an explanatory variable, the fulfilment ratio, that captures the liquidity need, although with a backward-looking orientation. The positive effect of the expected auction amount may therefore reflect the entry of marginal bidders in the auction as the forward-looking liquidity imbalance increases.
The long rate spread has a direct effect (0.4884) on the probability of participating in the auction. This is clearly consistent with efficient collateral management, and suggests that marginal bidders seek to ride the yield curve.
The short rate spread also has a direct effect (1.8815) on the probability of bidding, in line with the notion that rate hike expectations attract more bidders in the primary market for liquidity.
Bid amount
The regression for the (scaled) individual bid amount is performed according to equation The country fulfilment ratio affects inversely the bid amount (-0.0006), as expected.
The forward rate spread displays a negative effect on the bid amount (-0.0715), contrary to our a priori. When the forward 2-week rate is larger than the spot rate, demand decreases.
This seems at odds with the idea that the forward rate spread reflects rate change expectations.
However, we note that the spread is also mechanically linked to the very short term liquidity situation at the time of the auction, in addition to more fundamental factors. Let's take the example of a negative forward spread, which is true on average and by a small amount (see Table   4 ). This might be viewed as the result of a slightly tight liquidity situation today compared to what the market expects it to be in a week's time. If that is the case, then the coefficient estimate says that bidders demand more in the current auction, possibly owing to quantity constraints, and give up the rate decrease that is priced in the forward rate.
Interest rate volatility does not significantly contribute to explain demand in the auction.
The maturing auction amount has a positive and highly significant effect on bid amount.
The size of the coefficient (0.5391) implies that bidders tend to renew on average over one half of the maturing auction amount. This finding lends further support to the hypothesis that bidders have a target level for end-of-day reserves.
The post underbidding dummy displays a positive effect on bid amount (0.0923), while the period end dummy is not significant.
The coefficient of the bidder size variable is equal to 0.8472 and highly significant.
Bearing in mind that the size variable is given by the individual reserve requirement divided by the same scale variable as the bid amount, this implies that on average each bidder demands in the auction an amount corresponding to almost 85 per cent of his requirement.
The expected auction amount does not have a significant effect on the bid amount.
Consistently with the notion that bidders manage their collateral in an efficient manner, the long rate spread has a positive effect on the bid amount (0.0714). When the long rate increases relative to the monetary policy rate, it becomes more convenient to hold or acquire collateral and thus participate in the auction, compared to the alternative of borrowing in the unsecured market.
The short rate spread also significantly affects the bid amount, with the expected sign (0.1280). This finding lends support to the prediction that bidders demand is elastic to short term rate expectations.
Finally, the λ variable (0.0343) is highly significant, revealing the presence of a sample selection effect.
Average bid rate
The regression for the bid rate is carried out using equation (4), where
x is the vector of explanatory variables for the average bid rate t i y , of bidder i in auction t and β is the new coefficients vector. The regression results are given in Table 5 , column R. With the exception of bidder size, all coefficient estimates are highly significant. As we would expect, the most significant variable is by far the short rate spread, which guides bidders' choices. Controlling for the other decision variables, the coefficient (0.7691) implies that on average bidders shade their 20 bids below market rates, and "shift" on the bid rate slightly over three quarters of the 2-week money market rate spread over the minimum auction rate 27 .
The fulfilment ratio has a negative effect (-0.0001), as predicted on the basis of optimising behaviour on the part of bidders. When the liquidity position is large, bidders shade their bids more, and vice versa.
The forward rate spread has a positive effect (0.0060), implying that bidders raise the bid rate when the spot market rate is low compared to its expected value at the next auction. This finding is also consistent with the notion that bidders behave efficiently.
Short rate volatility has a positive effect on the bid rate (2.7412). This finding would seem consistent with bidders' risk aversion and the loser's nightmare hypothesis.
The maturing MRO amount has a positive effect on the bid rate (0.0041). This lends additional support to the hypothesis that bidders have a target level of reserves in their decision process, and they are prepared to pay a price for it.
The two dummies for the likelihood of a liquidity squeeze provide apparently mixed signals. The post underbidding dummy shows a negative effect on bid rates (-0.0213), while the period end dummy has a positive effect (0.0060). Our interpretation is that, since after an underbidding episode the market rate rapidly rises, and the bid rate is linked to the market rate through the short rate spread, underbidding provides leeway for some degree of bid shading compared to the average behaviour.
The bidder size affects negatively the bid rate (-0.0035), although the effect is not statistically significant.
The expected MRO amount exerts a negative effect on the bid rate (-0.0002). This effect is consistent with the cost of collateral hypothesis.
The effect of the long rate spread on bid rates is negative (-0.0101). Our interpretation is that, as collateral becomes cheaper and more bidders enter into play (see section 5.1), the marginal bidders are less liquidity constrained than the "core" bidders, thus pushing bid rates down.
The λ variable (0.0078) is highly significant, implying again the presence of a sample selection effect.
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Bid rate dispersion
The regression for bid rate dispersion is based on equation (4) Table 5 , column D. All coefficient estimates are highly significant. The extremely large values of the t statistics are related to the low degree of variation in bid rate dispersion, as we noted in section 3.2, and to the use of fixed effects. In other words, if a given bidder submits, say, 2 bids that differ by 2 basis points in one auction, it is likely that he will submit 2 bids differing by 2 basis points in any other auction.
The country fulfilment ratio has a positive effect on bid rate dispersion (2.E-5). This implies that as the liquidity position becomes more comfortable, each bidder tends to make a broader use of the possibility to submit multiple bids.
The forward rate spread also has a positive effect on dispersion (0.0012).
Based on auction theory, we predicted that short rate volatility will induce bidders to disperse more. This hypothesis is confirmed by the positive sign of the coefficient for market rate volatility (0.0158).
The maturing auction amount displays a positive effect on bid dispersion (0.0006). We record this finding, although we had no a priori on this relationship.
The likelihood of a short liquidity squeeze, captured by the two dummy variables, increases bid rate dispersion. We note that the effect of an underbidding episode on dispersion (0.0049) is around ten times as large as the "normal" effect at the end of each maintenance period (0.0005).
Large bidders disperse rates more, as shown by the positive coefficient for the bidder size (0.0025). This seems consistent with the notion that large bidders behave more efficiently.
The cost of collateral hypothesis implies a positive effect of the expected MRO amount on rate dispersion. This is confirmed by our regression coefficient (2.E-6).
The long rate spread has a positive effect on bid rate dispersion (0.0006).
Our last hypothesis was that an increase in the short rate spread should induce bidders to disperse more. This is confirmed by our coefficient estimate (0.0305).
The λ variable (-0.0004) is highly significant, showing the presence of a sample selection effect. 
Country effects
We extend the basic model presented in section 4 by introducing the interaction of country dummies, denoted by c d , with each explanatory variable. For simplicity we omit the analysis of bid rate dispersion, owing to its scarce variability, as well as the interactions of the two dummies that capture the likelihood of a short squeeze.
In the case of the selection equation we extend equation (5) as follows:
The first part of the right-hand side of equation (6) is like that in equation (5), while the double summation term constructs the country interactions and the γ 's are the country effects to be estimated. For the model's identification we take German bidders, representing the prevalent group, as our baseline (captured by the δ 's) and omit the interaction of the variables with the country dummy for Germany. We thus have j running from 1 (country fulfilment ratio) to 8 (short rate spread), while the country index c runs from 1 to 10.
Analogously, we investigate the country effects on the bid amount and the average bid rate using the following extension of equation (4):
Table 6 provides the regression results of equation (6), whereas Tables 7 and 8 give the results for the bid amount and, respectively, the average bid rate based on equation (7). We rank the country dummies in alphabetical order as follows: AT (Austria), BE (Belgium), ES (Spain), . In very general terms, we observe a large number of significant coefficients: taking the 5 percent confidence level, the count of significant coefficients is 48 (out of 88) in Table 6 , 52 in Table 7 , 55 in Table 8 . We again find extremely significant values of λ .
To improve the readability of our results, in Table 9 we report the significant effects only for the three equations, providing for each country different from DE the total effect of each variable. Therefore, rather than looking in detail at Tables 6-8, we move to the comparative table and examine the main effects of each explanatory variable across the three equations of interest.
Starting with the effect of volatility, we note that bidders from FR, IT, LU, NL and PT share with bidders from DE a "moderate" negative impact on participation, equal to -15.6062.
On the other hand, the impact is from 3 to 5 times larger for bidders from AT, BE, ES, FI and IE. This points to a larger fear of the winner's curse in the latter group of countries.
The explanatory variable which reveals the largest number of country variations is the maturing amount of refinancing. In terms of the participation decision, taking as a benchmark the coefficient for DE, equal to around 1, we observe that almost all countries display a larger effect. This reaches a maximum in the case of FR, with a coefficient roughly equal to 7. However, in terms of bid amount we note that the country which demands the largest fraction of the amount on expiry is DE (0. (8.0132) . This is suggestive of the idea that in these countries, more than elsewhere, a two-tier structure is present in the domestic money market.
An increase in the long rate spread has the largest impact on auction participation in the case of BE (1.0050) and LU (0.8678). This is not surprising, since in those countries a large amount of relatively cheap collateral is available, and marginal bidders may find it convenient to enter the auction with the main aim of riding the yield curve. In terms of bid amount, the biggest impact is observed for ES (0.2014) and FI (0.2675). Furthermore, in those two countries the degree of bid shading resulting from the bid rate equation, and associated with an increase in the long rate spread, is on the low side in absolute value (-0.0041 for ES and -0.0065 for FI, com-pared to -0.0113 for DE). If we take the view that the long rate spread is an inverse measure of collateral cost, then the above findings suggest that ES and FI are the countries where such cost may be more binding.
Finally, we turn to the effects of the short rate spread. In terms of the probability of bidding, three countries distinguish themselves from the rest. ES displays the largest coefficient 
Size effects
In this section we restrict our data sample to two groups of bidders. The first group includes all bidders in the lowest two deciles ranked by size, the second group includes all bidders in the highest two deciles by size. We thus specialise the basic regressions (5) and (4) taking the "small" as the baseline case and interacting a Large bidder dummy (LBD), equal to 1 if the bidder belongs to the second group, with each of the explanatory variables (except the liquidity squeeze dummies). In the case of bidders' participation the equation is as follows:
We estimate equation (8) by means of a fixed effects panel probit regression. Analogously, we modify equation (4) to obtain:
We estimate equation (9) for each of the three endogenous variables bid amount, rate and dispersion by means of the Wooldridge two-step procedure.
The results of equations (8) and (9) are given in Table 10 . The large bidders display a number of significant differences compared to the small ones. While the effect of country reserve fulfilment on dispersion is positive for the small (0.0001), it becomes nil for the large. In-terestingly, when volatility is high the small bidders withdraw from the auction (with a coefficient of -4.9417 in the P column) at a relatively low rate compared to the large bidders (with a differential coefficient of -33.4189).
The maturing amount of refinancing is not an important factor in the participation decision for the big bidders as opposed to the small ones, since we note that the differential effect for the former (-3.4338) almost cancels out the baseline effect for the latter (4.0431 These findings point to the following conclusions. First, while large bidders are more reactive to an increase in volatility, their participation is otherwise more stable than that of small bidders, and the latter are thus more likely to have withdrawn from the MROs over our sample period. Second, large bidders seem less risk averse than small bidders, probably on account of their better access to the money market. Third, it appears that collateral is managed more efficiently by large bidders, also because they make a better use of the possibility to submit multiple bids. Fourth, large bidders set the average bid rate closer to the money market rate.
Bank group effects
In order to investigate the effects of participation in a banking group, we extract in the first place the sample of the 79 bidders that belong to a group (we will refer to them as the group bidders). Second, to construct a control sample, for each group bidder we extract another bidder not belonging to a group, from the same country and with similar size (we will call those in the second sample the single bidders). Next we construct a Bank group dummy (BGD), equal to 1 in the case of group bidders and to 0 for single bidders. We then run the participation probit using equation (8) above, where we replace the variable LBD with the BGD dummy. Similarly, we examine bid amount, rate and dispersion by means of equation (9) with the same replacement. Table 11 gives the empirical estimates. Interestingly, we note that volatility shows an effect not revealed by the previous estimates. Namely, volatility has a negative impact on the bid amount, equal to -10.8940 in the case of single bidders and augmented in absolute value by -20.9629 for group bidders. This seems to indicate that group bidders are responsive to the winner's curse, a phenomenon that was not statistically significant in the regression of the previous section. However, group bidders also increase the bid rate when volatility is high (with a differential effect of 0.4925 compared to the baseline of 2.8029, from column R).
Group bidders demand in the auction a larger proportion of the amount on expiry (with a coefficient of 0.1381 in addition to a baseline of 0.4196, from column B) and are less keen on paying a price for the renewal of the operation (with a differential coefficient of -0.0019 compared to a baseline effect of 0.0041, from column R).
The positive effect of size on bid amount, which we found in the estimate of the general model, is particularly strong for group bidders (2.0590, to be added to -0.5393 of the baseline).
Group bidders significantly increase demand in the auction when the expected MRO amount increases (with a differential effect of 0.0006), while single bidders show a negative effect. Finally, in analogy with the evidence for large bidders of the previous section, we find that group bidders significantly increase their demand in the auction when the long rate spread increases (with a differential effect equal to 0.1004 on top of the baseline coefficient equal to 0.1720).
In the case of the participation decision, the main effect is the lower responsiveness of group bidders to the expected size of the auction (-0.0035 in addition to 0.0050, from column P). At the same time, when the latter increases group bidders disperse more than single bidders (with a differential coefficient equal to 2.2E-5 compared to a baseline value hardly distinguishable from 0).
Two findings provide an argument in favour of the transnational bank hypothesis. First, group bidders demand in the auction an amount of reserves that is equal to roughly 1.5 times their reserve requirement (i.e. the size variable) against an average for the entire population of 0.8 (from Table 5 ). Second, unlike single bidders, group bidders increase their demand when the expected auction amount increases. This clearly indicates that they are set to act as brokers of the Eurosystem liquidity provision towards the rest of the banking system. However, when volatility increases group bidders are ready to lower the bid amount and, at the same time, they bid the rate up. Finally, we note that group bidders pursue efficiency in the management of collateral, through their responsiveness to changes in the slope of the yield curve and, hence, in collateral cost.
Conclusion
We formulated an analytical framework for the decision to participate in the Eurosystem monetary policy auctions and the three variables that fully characterise individual bidding behaviour. Our findings generally support the hypotheses derived from reserve management theory. In particular, the country reserve fulfilment ratio has an inverse impact on participation, amount and bid rate. The forward rate spread affects positively the decision to participate and the bid rate. Interest rate volatility shows mixed effects. An increase in volatility reduces auction participation but, at the same time, pushes bid rates up. The latter finding suggests that marginal bidders are sensitive to the winner's curse and display a low risk aversion, as revealed by their exit from the auction when volatility increases; at the same time, "core" bidders seem to have a larger degree of risk aversion, shown by their willingness to bid rates up when volatility is high.
The individual amount on expiry exerts a positive effect on all variables, supporting the hypothesis that banks have a target level of end-of-day reserves for settlement purposes or due to the preference for a smooth fulfilment pattern.
Based on auction theory, we included two indicator variables reflecting the increased likelihood of a post-auction liquidity squeeze in the interbank market. These variables generally display the predicted effects on participation, bid amount and dispersion. An additional underpinning of the model was provided by the transnational bank hypothesis of Freixas-Holthausen, according to which larger banks with a multinational profile use their informational advantage to arbitrage out the differences in interest rates across countries. This feature would induce transnational banks to participate and bid in the auction above the rest of banks. Indeed, the results of the general model show that the bidder size has a positive effect on both the likelihood of bidding and the amount. The finding that the expected auction amount has a negative effect on bid rates, and that the long rate spread displays a positive effect on participation and bid amount, both support the view that bidders seek to make an efficient use of collateral.
Our results show the presence of national patterns in auction participation and bidding, which may to a large extent be attributed to differences in the structure of domestic money markets. The cost and availability of collateral also play an important role. Our analytical framework helped us interpret these patterns. Broadly speaking, we can safely dismiss the idea that bidders' behaviour is homogeneous across the euro area in favour of a more diversified view.
We sought to test whether two important bidder attributes, size and participation in a banking group, are powerful enough to characterise auction participation and bidding across the national borders. The answer from our evidence is affirmative. Auction participation by large bidders and group bidders is more stable over time compared to small bidders and, respectively, single bidders. However, when volatility increases the former two groups withdraw more swiftly from the auctions, on account of their better access to the money market. Group bidders demand larger amounts in the auction, thus showing their attitude to act as liquidity brokers towards the rest of the banking system. Large bidders and group bidders manage their collateral more efficiently, as revealed by their superior ability to ride the yield curve and submit multiple bids. The latter findings provide additional support for the view that group bidders are able to play a multinational role.
Our findings have important implications on the issue of integration in the money market of the euro area. In the first place, the documented relevance of microeconomic collateral management suggests that the future introduction of the single collateral list, by creating a level playing field in terms of collateral availability and cost, will foster the integration of bidders' behaviour in the repo auctions. Second, we showed the peculiar role of large banks and group banks and provided clear arguments in favour of the transnational bank hypothesis. The existence of efficient, multinational liquidity brokers, in addition to a larger mass of medium and small players, is an extra market factor that will promote integration in the euro money market.
Along with the empirical results, the analytical framework and the methodology adopted in this paper lend themselves as a reference for future analyses of bidding in the Eurosystem repo auctions, when new developments will suggest the opportunity to re-examine the performance of the primary segment of the euro money market. We refer in particular to changes in the composition of the collateral pool, further advances in the concentration of the banking industry and the enlargement of the monetary union.
Appendix -The ARCH model for interest rate volatility
The empirical literature abounds in the choice of alternative specifications for the volatility of interest rates. E.g., in the case of the US federal funds rate, Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2000) adopt an EGARCH(1,1) model. Our problem is to estimate the daily conditional variance of the 2-week EONIA swap rate.
We considered the ARCH(1) as the obvious candidate model, and started with a specification search on the explanatory variables for the conditional mean and variance of the 2-week rate. This led to the estimates presented in Table 12 . As concerns the conditional mean equation, the lagged rate enters with coefficient 1 and we could not find any other significant and plausible explanatory variable, consistently with the hypothesis that the rate follows a martingale process. Conditional variance is positively affected in the first place by the short rate spread, with a coefficient of 3.503, which we took with one lag to avoid simultaneous endogeneity problems. and, respectively, the second last working day of the month. They have a technical nature, related to month-end increases in the demand for short term funds for regulatory purposes. Their coefficients present mixed signs, showing that uncertainty on the interest rate is overall relieved on the last day of the month. The Second-last in period dummy is equal to 1 on the second last day of the maintenance period. This dummy has a positive effect (0.936) on variance. The dummy for the last day of the period turned out to be insignificant. Finally, the ARCH coefficient is equal to 0.290. All estimates are highly significant.
In the specification search for conditional variance we tried the inclusion of additional explanatory variables and calendar dummies, which turned out insignificant. We also tried variations of the ARCH model, like an ARCH(2) specification, the inclusion of an AR(1) term, a GARCH(1,1) model, an EGARCH(1,1) model, and so on. In most cases the alternative specifications did not converge. In the remaining cases the estimates led to rejection of the alternative specifications. Short rate spread Table 12 
Explanatory variables Dependent variables and hypotheses
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ARCH ESTIMATION FOR 2-WEEK INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
We report our specification for the conditional variance of the daily 2-week EONIA swap rate (see Appendix 1). The Governing council dummy takes the value 1 on the day of the ECB Governing Council meeting and 0 otherwise. The Negative MRO dummy is equal to 1 on auction day if the lagged short spread is negative, i.e. when the probability of underbidding is positive. The post underbidding dummy takes the value 1 after the occurrence of an underbidding episode. The Last-in-month and Second-last-in-month dummies take value 1 on the last and, respectively, the second last working day of the month. The Second-last in period dummy is equal to 1 on the second last day of the maintenance period. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 percent or less.
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